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In the mid-18
th century, a new concept of the theater emerged that became known under the 
formula (coined by Denis Diderot in 1758) of the “fourth wall”. Its distinctive trait was the 
separation of stage and audience. Whereas previous forms of theater, whether of a popular, 
religious or court provenance, had always relied on some kind of physical interaction between 
actors and spectators, any such direct interaction was now banned. The actors were to play as 
if there were no audience; “play as if the curtain were not drawn,“ Diderot writes.
1 
Correspondingly, the spectators were to disregard the actors’ physical presence and become 
absorbed in the world of the scenic illusion. In other words, actors and audience were to 
suppress the consciousness of what they were doing – acting and watching. Taken in its full 
theoretical consequence, this was a theater against the very nature of theater, an anti-theatrical 
theater so to speak that suspended the most basic condition of any theatrical representation, 
assembling audience and actors in one room at the same time.
2 The imaginary fourth wall, on 
the one hand, enclosed the actors within the fictional world they represented, using their ‘real’ 
bodies as a medium for their respective roles, and, on the other hand, encouraged the 
spectators to negate their own physical presence as they became increasingly immersed in the 
fictional world represented on stage.
3  
                                                 
1 Denis Diderot, De la poésie dramatique (1758): “Soit donc que vous composiez, soit que vous jouiez, ne 
pensez non plus au spectateur que s’il n’existait pas. Imaginez, sur le bord du théâtre, un grand mur qui vous 
sépare du parterre; jouez comme si la toile ne se levait pas,“ In: Œuvres esthétiques, Paris 1988, p. 231. For 
Diderot in German, see the contemporary translation by Lessing of his relevant writings: Das Theater des Herrn 
Diderot. Aus dem Französischen übersetzt von Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, ed. Klaus-Detlev Müller, Stuttgart 
1986; here p. 340 (“Man denke also, sowohl während dem Schreiben als während dem Spielen, an den 
Zuschauer ebenso wenig, als ob gar keiner da wäre. Man stelle sich an dem äußersten Rande der Bühne eine 
große Mauer vor, durch die das Parterr [sic] abgesondert wird. Man spiele, als ob der Vorhang nicht aufgezogen 
würde.“) 
2 Christopher Wild, Theater der Keuschheit, Keuschheit des Theaters. Zu einer Geschichte der (Anti ) 
Theatralität von Gryphius bis Kleist, Freiburg im Breisgau 2003. 
3 For the general concept, with particular respect to Diderot’s writings on the arts, cf. the seminal study by 
Michael Fried, Absorption and Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the Age of Diderot. Chicago: Chicago 
UP, 1980. – The standard study for the German historical context is: Erika Fischer-Lichte, Semiotik des 
Theaters. Eine Einführung, vol. 2: Vom „künstlichen“ zum „natürlichen“ Zeichen. Theater des Barock und der 
Aufklärung, Tübingen 1983. With focus on the French context: Wolfgang Orlich, „‚Realismus der Illusion – 
Illusion des Realismus‘. Bemerkungen zur Theaterpraxis und Dramentheorie in der Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts,“ 
Romanistische Zeitschrift für Literaturgeschichte 8 (1984), pp. 431-447. – Recent studies on the topic include: 
Johannes Friedrich Lehmann, Der Blick durch die Wand. Zur Geschichte des Theaterzuschauers und des Schneider 
  2 
The fourth wall, then, cuts through the physical reality of the here and now of the theater 
space and event in order to create another reality: actors and spectators, separated from each 
other as well as removed from their respective bodies, come together in an imaginary beyond. 
They move out of their normal space and time into an incorporeal, or spiritual, existence. This 
is in no way an easy transition. In a stunning and, at first glance, enigmatic phrase from his 
seminal essay De la poésie dramatique (1758), Diderot compares the spectators’ experience 
to that of an earthquake (“as if they felt the earth trembling underneath them”).
4 The 
comparison, which has gone largely unnoticed by Diderot scholars,
5 even suggests a violence 
inherent in the new theatrical arrangement and the viewing position prescribed by it. While in 
the “old” theater spectators and actors had shared a common space of representation (usually 
manifest also in an architectural continuity between audience and stage), the imagined fourth 
wall interrupted that continuity and shook the spectators out of their spatial grounded-ness 
into the elusive dimension of the scenic tableau (a category to which I will briefly return at 
the end). 
In the following I wish to explore the significance of this re-organization of spectatorship 
(which was also one of acting) for the formation of an imaginary social body. The theater of 
the fourth wall, I suggest, was a model place to experience an abstract collective, a genuinely 
modern notion distinguished from earlier notions of collectives based in immediate physical 
contact. Experiencing this new, abstract collective meant precisely experiencing it in a 
concrete, bodily way: as a “shaking of the ground,“ tremblement de terre. For, after all, the 
theater of the fourth wall remained a theater, a place where people physically gather in order 
to watch a representation by live actors. We can thus specify the thesis that the new theater 
provided a space for experiencing directly and communally the transition from the ‘old’ to the 
‘new’ notion of community. In this way, it may have contributed substantially to the 
implementation and evolution of such significant collective notions as “the nation”, “the 
                                                                                                                                                          
Visuellen bei Diderot und Lessing. Freiburg 2000; Günther Heeg, Das Phantasma der natürlichen Gestalt. 
Körper, Sprache und Bild im Theater des 18. Jahrhunderts, Frankfurt am Main/Basel 2000; Matthias Rothe, 
Lesen und Zuschauen im 18. Jahrhundert. Die Erzeugung und Aufhebung von Abwesenheit, Würzburg 2005. – 
See also my article (of which the present article is an expansion): „Familiendramaturgie und Nationaltheateridee. 
Zur Publikumskonzeption in der deutschen und französischen Dramaturgie des 18. Jahrhunderts,“ in: Barbara 
Schmidt-Haberkamp, Uwe Steiner, Brunhilde Wehinger (eds.), Europäischer Kulturtransfer im 18. Jahrhundert. 
Europäische Literaturen – Europäische Literatur?, Berlin 2002 (= Aufklärung und Europa. Schriftenreihe des 
Forschungszentrums Europäische Aufklärung e.V.), pp. 59-77.  
4 Denis Diderot, De la poésie dramatique (Das Theater des Herrn Diderot [note…], p. 301) (note 1) p. 198 („les 
esprits seront troublés tels que ceux qui, dans les tremblements d’une partie du globe, voient les murs de leurs 
maisons vaciller et sentent la terre se dérober sous leurs pieds“). 
5 See, however, Suzanne Guerlac, “The Tableau and Authority in Diderot’s Aesthetics”, in: Studies on Voltaire 
and the Eighteenth Century 219 (1983), pp. 183-193; Günther Heeg, “Massive Erhebung. Das französische 
Theatertableau des 18. Jahrhunderts als Medium der Affektsteuerung und Wahrnehmungslenkung“, in: Erika 
Fischer-Lichte (ed.), Wahrnehmung und Medialität, Tübingen/Basel 2001, p. 56sq. Schneider 
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republic”, or, for that matter, “humankind”. The theater of the fourth wall provided these 
collectives with an imaginary body. 
Before proceeding, let me clarify that the argument principally refers to the theoretical 
concept of the fourth wall as it was elaborated in Diderot’s dramaturgical writings of the 
1750’s and further developed by Lessing (who held his French contemporary in high esteem 
and translated his relevant works, but conceived his key ideas independently). The fact that 
the concept of the fourth wall became dominant in theatrical practice only in the nineteenth 
century – and even then not in the purity of its initial conception – does not diminish its 
importance for what I am calling here the experience of a modern, i.e. abstract collective.
6 – 
The paper falls into two sections: The first deals with the general transformation of the social 
body through the new concepts of sympathy and empathy; the second then turns to some 
relevant specifics of the fourth wall dramaturgy and concludes with a glance at dramatic 
examples.  
 
 
I. 
Much of the scholarly work on the cultural history of the human body is based on an 
opposition between a traditional ‘collective’ and a modern individual body (e.g., Bakhtin, 
Elias, Foucault). In this perspective, the body of the disciplined modern individual, the homo 
clausus, emerged by separating itself from an earlier expansive body model characterized by 
intense physical exchange with its environment and other bodies – sexual, reproductive, 
infectious – disregarding individual body boundaries. Less attention has been paid to the new 
notions of collectives conceived on the basis of these “closed”, individualized bodies. In a 
voluminous monograph of 1999, Albrecht Koschorke has undertaken to fill this gap.
7 
Koschorke’s historical focus is on the sensibility movement of the mid-18
th century, the age 
of Empfindsamkeit, whose distinctive traits he sees as the result of a fundamental shift in the 
physiological understanding of the body, which in its turn was tied to an equally fundamental 
media transformation. On the basis of a rich, mostly non-literary, source material such as 
medical, psychological and moral treatises and the numerous letter exchanges of the time, 
Koschorke shows how an older notion of the body as an „exchange system of humoral fluids“ 
                                                 
6 Theater historians vary in their accounts of the actual realization of the fourth wall dramaturgy; there is, 
however, a general agreement (with regard to the end of the 18
th century) that long before it became an 
“institution on stage” it had become an “institution in the mind” (“Einrichtung im Kopf”); cf. Rothe (note 3), p. 
169. 
7 Albrecht Koschorke, Körperströme und Schriftverkehr. Mediologie des 18. Jahrhunderts, Munich 1999. A 
good summary is provided by the same author’s article: “Alphabetisation und Empfindsamkeit”, in: Hans-Jürgen 
Schings (ed.), Der ganze Mensch. Anthropologie und Literatur im 18. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1994, pp. 605-628. Schneider 
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physically connected with its natural environment and other bodies, was replaced by a 
“neurological” concept of a self-sufficient energetic system communicating with other bodies 
through non-corporeal channels. This new system of communication among bodies was what 
the age labeled, and acclaimed as, “sympathy”. “Sympathy” (and its correlate, “empathy“) 
designated a spiritual transference between “souls” that took the place of the former physical 
transaction (variably termed “transfusion,“ “contagion,“ “contamination,“ “miasmic” 
infection etc). In Koschorke’s metaphorical wording: The dissolution of the "contagious 
interconnectedness“ (“kontagiöse Verschlungenheit”, p. 52) and “drainage of the 
physiological sphere of influence“ (“Trockenlegung” des “physiologischen Einzugsgebiets”, 
p. 47, 74, 215) among the bodies led to a “new, transcending order of circulation" (p. 86) 
replacing interaction of bodies with communication of “souls”. 
Crucial in Koschorke’s argument is the linkage between this shift in the concept of the human 
body and the rapidly accelerating process of alphabetization. The isolation of the physical 
bodies and their spiritual (re-) integration as “souls“ coincided with, and were made possible 
by, the transformation of an older culture built on direct interaction and orality into one built 
on distance communication and literacy. There is no causal prior of the one transformation 
process over the other; both fed on each other, each strengthening the impact of the other. 
Still, Koschorke’s main emphasis is on the performative power of the media revolution. It was 
the „process of literalization of human relations”, he writes, which disempowered man’s 
orientation through corporeal interaction and created the condition for the “capacity of 
abstraction” that ultimately “distilled an idea of humanity from the structured social body of 
premodern society“ (p. 188). 
The same culture of an established literacy, Koschorke goes on to argue, created those 
“phantasms“ of immediacy and intimacy that literary and cultural history has come to identify 
with the movement of Empfindsamkeit, without, however, taking into account their “media 
apriori”. This “forgetfulness” repeated the historical movement’s own suppression of its basis 
in widespread literacy, a suppression that was essential for its operative functioning. The 
telling example for the phantasmatic (re-) creation of an obsolete orality and intimate 
interaction under the conditions of anonymous print circulation is the genre of the epistolary 
novel; its form of a fictive letter exchange illustrates the correlation of physical distance and 
emotional closeness characteristic of the empfindsame psyche. Koschorke convincingly 
demonstrates how the same narrative structure corresponds to a new system of literary 
communication: In the same fashion in which the (“new”) lovers absent themselves from each 
other in order to achieve the ideal communication of souls, the book author bonds with the Schneider 
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anonymous readership in an imaginary emotional community. Seen in this perspective, the 
“sentimental” concept of a disembodied love only serves as the semantic representation of an 
underlying media strategy, namely to bring together the solitary and dispersed readers in a 
“community of absentees”. This, finally, touches on the last aspect in Koschorke’s study 
important for the present context: Fictitious orality and interaction, the author asserts, were 
instrumental in reconciling the new reading public with the abstract culture of writing, 
supplying the latter, as it were, with a face and a body. In this manner, the combination of 
internalized writing and the phantasms of immediacy contributed to the “generalization of the 
concept of ‚man’ and to the development of corresponding abstract ‚feelings for humanity’, 
i.e. the affective cathecting [Besetzung] of imaginary collectives“ (p. 211). 
What is the place of theater in this “mediological” scenario? Somewhat surprisingly, 
Koschorke touches only marginally on the theater, although his argument rests to a large 
extent on the 18
th-century concept of sympathy, which found its most obvious aesthetic 
realization in the theatrical genre, as already the prominent place of “empathy,” 
“compassion,” Mitleid in the dramaturgy of the time suggests. Yet the sympathy provoked by 
the theater performance is not identical with the one provoked by silent reading; it needs to be 
specified according to the nature of that medium, which is indissolubly tied to orality and 
physical presence. In the theater of the fourth wall, which may now also be called a theater 
under the conditions of developed literacy, sympathetic “distance communication” was 
enacted in the physical presence of bodies; and, conversely, the immediacy of this presence 
was broken and transformed into the ‘higher’ presence of a “communion of souls”. The 
theatrical imagination (to repeat: understood as the imagination of the audience of the fourth 
wall concept in its theoretical purity) had its place between the physical and the spiritual, 
between speaking and writing, between immediate face-to-face interaction and distance 
communication, and, with all this, between a concrete and an imaginary collective. This gave 
it a paradoxical nature, vacillating between the older corporeal “infection” and the new 
emotional “affection” model of the collective. Put positively, this two-sidedness turned the 
theater into a space where the transition from the one to the other, i.e. the spiritual 
transformation of the physical collective became itself a concrete, near-physical experience. – 
In order to understand this imaginary transaction between audience and stage that replaced 
the traditional physical one while still partaking of it, it is useful first to turn to the general 
concept of sympathy as it was developed within a larger conceptual framework than the 
theater. In 18
th century thought, sympathy is closely tied to the sense of sight as well as to the 
imagination. At the sight of another person’s situation and expression, in particular one of Schneider 
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suffering, sympathy mediates to us through the imagination that person’s inner state of 
feeling; generally speaking, it allows humans to share the feeling of their fellow humans 
without being actually hit by the cause of that feeling. In this sense, sympathy qualifies quite 
precisely as a “medium”. Whereas in the old “humoral” body concept as Koschorke describes 
it, emotions and affects were transferred in the mode of direct physical contact (“affection” 
being literally understood as “infection”), sympathy shares the dual character of corporeal 
distance and psychological nearness characteristic of writing and the phantasm of immediacy 
produced by it. Sympathy removes us from our own body and places us into another’s body; 
it provides imaginative access – the only possible access – to the interior life of other humans 
by way of analogy with our own sensations and feelings. In the words of Adam Smith: “By 
the imagination we place ourselves in his [= the suffering person’s; HJS] situation, we 
conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and 
become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his 
sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike 
them” (I,1; my emphasis).
8  
 
Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, which accords sympathy a significant function for the 
build-up of society, appeared at almost the same time (1759) when Diderot and Lessing 
developed their dramaturgical thoughts (added to this list must be Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 
Discourse on Inequality from 1755 with its seminal account of the key human faculty of pity; 
it was instantly translated by Moses Mendelssohn and read by his friend Lessing). What 
makes Smith’s concept relevant for the theater is its specular, one could even say: 
spectatorial structure. By taking sight, whether direct physical sight or an internally produced 
intuition (as in reading), as the source for sympathy’s imaginary transposition, Smith also 
reflects on the specific quality that the (real or fictional) object must possess in order to arouse 
the spectator’s sympathy. It is at this point that an intellectual component comes into play, 
which characterizes the imagination as a universalizing medium. While Smith insists on the 
(primary or secondary) immediacy of sight as origin of the sympathetic feeling, and while he 
even concedes the rare case of a direct corporeal “transfusion” of powerful feelings, he also 
insists – and especially so in the latter case – that the sheer impact of an unmotivated or 
unexplained passion or pain would obstruct sympathy and make the spectator turn the other 
way. We need to know the context and genesis of the particular situation in which the 
suffering person finds him/herself, we have to accommodate it to our comprehension. 
                                                 
8 Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, in: The Works of Adam Smith. In five volumes. Reprint of the 
edition 1811-1812, vol. 1, Aalen 1963, p. 2sq. Schneider 
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Knowing, which often means knowing more than the person involved, heightens our 
willingness to enter into the sufferer’s pain. Thus, the imaginary transposition into another 
person’s (painful) situation and the representation of his or her “passion” through “an 
analogous emotion” which “springs up, at the thought of his situation, in the breast of every 
attentive spectator,“ can be seen as a movement from the immediate physical plane to a more 
general and, potentially, universal level. The imaginary transport of ‘self’ into ‘other’ entails 
a process of intellectualization or spiritualization, Vergeistigung. 
In a further step, Smith moves even closer to the theatrical condition proper when he suggests 
that the suffering person has to tone down the outward expression of his or her pain in order 
to adjust to the spectator’s readiness to empathize (instead of arousing, in the extreme case, 
his “disgust”). The “person concerned” needs to “reduce the violence of the passions to that 
pitch of moderation, in which the impartial spectator can entirely enter into them”. The 
sufferer, that is to say, must become her or his own spectator before being able to become a 
suitable recipient of sympathy. The passions a spectator can not enter into are foremost gross 
physical ones like hunger, sexuality, violence etc., but they also include extreme anger and 
hatred, unless these are put into a context that makes them psychologically plausible and 
hence accessible. We might also say, any extreme passions need to be narrativized. Revealing 
for the implied process of rationalization is the example of resentment where, according to 
Smith, the spectator’s empathy is likely to be limited by the concern for the potential victim 
of the revenge. Sympathy, then, serves as a social medium in the literal sense of ‘mediating’ 
the one-sidedness, and implicitly the potential violence, of particular feelings and 
transforming them into socially compatible qualities. At one point, Smith speaks of the 
“mediocrity” as the necessary level of sympathy’s functioning (cf. I,2: “the pitch which the 
spectator can go along with, must lie, it is evident, in a certain mediocrity”). 
As such medium of mutual moderation, sympathy is not just one feeling among others but the 
primary “moral sentiment” binding society together; with a term taken from another 
conceptual register it might be termed a transcendental sentiment, whose function is to 
negotiate and integrate the manifold of the particular, often egotistical, emotions and passions 
into a harmonious whole. This is exactly the function that Lessing locates in dramaturgical 
(tragic) compassion or pity, Mitleid. In his earliest account of this crucial concept, formulated 
in a correspondence with his Berlin friends Mendelssohn und Nicolai in the mid-fifties, 
Lessing insists on its categorical difference from any particular passion that may be Schneider 
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represented on stage.
9 Mitleid is not at all a weaker copy of an original emotion (again: real or 
fictive), it is not, Lessing writes, a “communicated affect” (“mitgeteilter Affekt”); it is an 
emotion in its own right originating in the soul of the spectator at the sight of suffering. At the 
same time, this emotion is all-inclusive. Lessing illustrates the relation between any particular 
affect and the affect of pity with the simile of two strings, the first of which is “touched” or 
plucked (berührt) while the second, without being plucked, joins in the vibration (beben).
10 
Compassion as ‘co-vibration’, Mitleid as Mit Bebung, elevates the corporeal and sensual on to 
a spiritual plane. It literally “abstracts,“ i.e. “draws away”, the viewer from the single passion, 
action, or situation. In the Hamburgische Dramaturgie, which appeared more than a decade 
later (1768/69), Lessing expands on the dramaturgical prerequisites for the successful 
provocation of the compassionate “vibration” in the audience, thus bringing the theatrical 
character of the sympathetic constellation, only implicit in Smith, into full view. Lessing 
insists on the actor’s (and the playwright’s) need to tone down extreme violence, to avoid 
abrupt shocks and unmotivated turns and to hold on to a psychologically and pragmatically 
plausible continuity of action conducive to the spectator’s sympathetic identification. In this 
context, Smith’s “mediocrity” re-appears in Lessing’s advocacy of a “middle character” 
(mittlerer Charakter). Mostly – and correctly – seen as a result of Lessing’s ‘bourgeois 
leanings’, this norm of the dramatic character as being “one of us” (mit uns von gleichem 
Schrot und Korne, as the often-cited phrase goes; cf. no. 75) must also be judged as a 
consequence of the spectatorial arrangement inherent in the social concept of sympathy.  
To sum up this part of the argument: If there was an obvious dramaturgical element involved 
in Adam Smith’s notion of the social function of sympathy, then, in symmetrical 
correspondence, Lessing’s dramaturgical concept of Mitleid represents the essential social 
function of the theater. For Lessing, theater must be a school of compassion, that is, it must 
serve as the means and medium of socialization in a potentially egalitarian society, for, as he 
says, “the most compassionate man is the best man”,
11 the man best prepared for conversing 
with his fellow human beings on an equal footing. The spectator is to leave the theater 
performance morally improved, i.e., more sensitive to other humans’ concerns and sufferings. 
But the goal is not just to make each member of the audience individually a better human 
being and citizen, but to make all of them together experience a better community already in 
                                                 
9 Gottthold Ephraim Lessing, [Briefwechsel über das Trauerspiel], in: Werke, ed. Herbert G. Göpfert, vol 4, 
Munich 1973, pp. 153-227. Cf. especially Lessing’s letters to Friedrich Nicolai from November 1756 and to 
Mendelssohn from December 18, 1756. – See also the still valuable afterword by Jochen Schulte-Sasse in: Id. 
(ed.), G.E. Lessing, M. Mendelssohn, F. Nicolai, Briefwechsel über das Trauerspiel, Munich 1972. 
10 To Mendelssohn, February 2, 1756; loc. cit. p. 203sq. 
11 Briefwechsel (note 9), p. 163. Schneider 
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the here and now of the theater; to unite them, metaphorically speaking, in a “vibrating 
body”, a Schwingungskörper, in which the particular qualities of the individuals are sublated 
within a higher totality. This leads us back to the thesis formulated earlier that the theater of 
the fourth wall provided a physical forum for the actual experiencing of the formation of an 
imaginary collective. What needs to be further explored is the precise relation between the 
individual act of sympathetic spectatorship – the empathetic identification with, or Einfühlung 
into, the scenic representation – on the one hand and this spiritual transformation of the 
audience as a whole.  
 
 
II 
 
If, as we have seen in Adam Smith’s theory, already the individual act of empathy involves a 
leveling or negotiation of the intensity of the original emotion, a concept which Lessing’s 
dramaturgy of Mitleid extended to the concept of a universal ‘emotion of emotions’ shared by 
all humans, then it is clear that the basis for the imaginary collective is not the identification 
with any specific stage character or action but rather the collective act as such of empathetic 
identification. In the process of being drawn into the scenic representation, the spectators 
ideally leave behind, or rise above, their particular determinations, whatever they are – social, 
genealogical, gender, ethnic, religious etc. – in order to merge with their fellow spectators 
across all boundaries in what Lessing on one occasion succinctly calls “the communal feeling 
of sympathizing spirits” (das gemeinschaftliche Gefühl sympathisierender Geister)
12. To be 
sure, there were specific dramatic subjects such as the ones taken from the intimate life of the 
nuclear or “bourgeois” family that were deemed particularly, or even exclusively, suitable for 
eliciting the (middle class) spectators’ empathy. But this thematic dimension it to be 
considered secondary to the primary act of subjective Einfühlung and its communal sharing. 
The same holds true of the intended moral effect: The spectators were certainly expected to 
recognize “their own” world in the play’s content and performance and possibly even to draw 
some moral instruction from it (e.g., the ludicrousness of a specific prejudice, such as anti-
Semitism, or the worthiness of the virtuous), but far more important was the overriding 
experience of their shedding all arbitrary and conventional boundaries and coming together in 
the awareness of a common humanity. “How beautiful mankind is in the theater!” Diderot 
exclaims. “Why separate again so quickly? Men are so good and happy when the righteous 
                                                 
12 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Ernst und Falk. Gespräche für Freimäurer, in: Werke (note 9), vol. 8, Munich 
1979, p. 481 Schneider 
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man receives their applause, when he brings them together and unites them!”
13 Not in the 
moral message of the righteous character and the plot lay the principal impact ascribed to the 
theater performance, but in the audience’s merging in general sympathy, brought about by 
each individual’s act of spontaneous empathy. A well known review of the premiere of 
Lessing’s bourgeois tragedy Miss Sara Sampson in 1755 reports that the spectators “for three 
and a half hours have listened, sat still like statues and kept weeping”.
14 
At this point, a brief look at the technical arrangement of the “fourth wall” theater in 
comparison with the traditional court theater is helpful.
15 The dramaturgy of the fourth wall 
not only separated the stage from the auditorium by making its front an invisible threshold 
between two ontologically distinct worlds – “He who acts and he who watches are two very 
different beings”, Diderot writes
16 – it also isolated the spectators from each other and 
minimized their physical presence. When at the start of the performance the lights in the 
auditorium were extinguished and the eyes and ears of the otherwise immobilized and muted 
spectators became exclusively (forcibly, one is tempted to say) fixed on the lit stage in front 
of them, they were cut off from their existential ties and lured into a wholly imaginary 
cosmos. Historical documents attest to the difficult task of accustoming the spectators to the 
disciplined passive role necessary for this immersion.
17 In contrast, the court stage had served 
as an eminent space of self-presentation for the members of that society; it reflected, in 
crystallized artistic form, the ceremonial behavior, ostentatious role-play, and celebratory 
rhetoric characteristic of the court aristocracy. Here, the stage action only extended (and 
elevated) the theatricality of the habitual social interaction of the audience; the roles of actors 
and spectators were mutually interchangeable, each individual seeing and being seen at the 
same time. Architecture, decoration, light, costumes, the physical position of the actors, and 
last but not least the presence of (privileged) spectators on-stage and the stage-like 
arrangement of spectators in the boxes – all these elements stressed the principal continuity 
between the world on stage and the social world in the auditorium. The festive theater event 
of the court society gathered its participants in a homogeneous space where they performed as 
actors of roles and actors of themselves who had to maintain (and potentially raise) their 
                                                 
13 PROBLEMA!! NICHT GEFUNDEN 
14 Lessing, Werke (note …), vol 2, Munich 1971, p.693 (letter by Ramler to Gleim, July 25, 1755. 
15 Still very informative is: Dagobert Frey, „Zuschauer und Bühne. Eine Untersuchung über das 
Realitätsproblem des Schauspiels“, in: Kunstwissenschaftliche Grundfragen. Prolegomena zu einer 
Kunstphilosophie, Wien 1946, 151-223. 
16 (“Celui qui agit et celui qui regarde, sont deux êtres très different”) 
17 This aspect has been stressed recently by several authors, see for instance Rudolf Dreßler, Von der 
Schaubühne zur Sittenschule. Das Theaterpublikum vor der vierten Wand, Berlin 1993, and Heeg, Phantasma 
(note…). See also the interesting case study by Susanne Eigenmann, Zwischen ästhetischer Raserei und 
aufgeklärter Disziplin. Hamburger Theater im späten 18. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart/Weimar 1994. Schneider 
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status and prestige within the set hierarchy. It provided a heightening affirmative mirror of 
that society; by no means did it aim at the kind of self-transcending and self-transformation 
inherent in the new concept of the fourth wall.  
Here, the discontinuity between stage and auditorium and the isolation of the individual 
spectators from their social environment served to create another world in the imaginary. But 
crucially: If the spectators’ physical presence was subdued or even suppressed, it was not, of 
course, eliminated from their consciousness. After all, it was the continuing awareness of that 
presence despite the isolated viewers’ absorption in the scenic illusion that distinguished the 
theatrical performance from the act of solitary reading. If Koschorke aptly dubs the new 
readership of the 18
th century a “community of absentees”, then the new theater audience 
represents an assembly of spectators absenting themselves in the process of projecting 
themselves into the scenic fiction and simultaneously, by the collective nature of this act, 
transforming themselves into a spiritual community. This communal transformation carried 
with it emphatic moments that resembled, indeed continued, features of the older collective 
body: moments of festivity and “infection” that now served the promotion of an intellectual 
collective which drew its energy from the extinction of all extraneous differences and reveled 
in the vision of a universal transparency of souls.
18 Diderot, for example, sees a touchstone for 
an individual’s moral integrity in the ability to have his emotions heightened by those of 
others in the theater: “The man whose emotions are not heightened by the great number of 
those who share in them, must possess some hidden vice; there is in his character something 
[…] of a recluse which I do not like.”
19 Twenty years later, Sébastien Mercier, a follower of 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, invokes the power of the theater to give society’s alienated members 
the experience “that, despite our public life, which seems to legitimize general fractiousness, 
we can nevertheless be united”.
20 Mercier calls for the enlargement of the auditorium and the 
tearing down of its dividing walls and boxes in order to encourage an “infinite flowing 
together of people” who will join in the general emotion (Rührung) of “unanimously shed 
                                                 
18 One example from Rémond de Saint-Albine, a theoretician of acting whom Lessing esteemed, here with 
reference to the emotion of „tristesse“: „Cette affection de l’ame [sic] est une espece [sic] de maladie 
épidémique, dont les progrès sont aussi rapides qu'étonnans. Contraire aux autres maladies, elle se communique 
par les yeux & par les oreilles“. Quoted in Alexander Košenina, Anthropologie und Schauspielkunst. Studien zur 
„eloquentia corporis“ im 18. Jahrhundert, Tübingen 1995, p. S. 128. 
19 Diderot, Entretiens sur le Fils naturel, in : Œuvres ésthetiques (note 1), pp. 69-175, here p. 127.  
20 Mercier, Du Théâtre, in: id., Mon Bonnet de  uit suivi de Du Théâtre, ed. by. Jean-Claude Bonnet, Paris 1999, 
p. 1235 (translation mine). (« Lorsque tout semble solliciter à l’égoïsme, enhardir la cupidité, chérissons les seuls 
moyens qui peuvent nous persuader que nos compatriotes ne nous sont pas étrangers, que nous pouvons être unis 
en dépit des mœurs publiques, qui semblent autoriser la scission générale.”) See the contemporary German 
translation: Sébastien Mercier/Heinrich Leopold Wagner,  euer Versuch über die Schauspielkunst. Aus dem 
Französischen. Mit einem Anhang aus Goethes Brieftasche. Faksimiledruck nach der Ausgabe von 1776, ed. 
Peter Pfaff, Heidelberg 1967, p. 137.  Schneider 
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tears”, tears of sympathy that carry the audience “beyond all the narrow purposes of self-love 
[amour-propre] and personal interest”
21 (p. 283sq.) the future “national drama”, he proclaims, 
will “connect the people with each other through the conquering emotion of pity and mutual 
sharing”
22 (p. 1). 
In Germany, the most fervent evocation of the theater viewers’ universal bonding is Schiller’s 
address of 1784 “On the Theater As a Moral Institution” (Über die Schaubühne als moralische 
Anstalt). Schiller starts out with the image of a collective melted together. Combining 
metaphorically the “light” of the frame stage with the idea of an ‘enlightenment from above’ 
typical of the alliance of German intellectuals with Enlightened Absolutism, Schiller writes: 
“The theater is the common channel through which the light of wisdom pours down from the 
thinking better part of the people, and from where it spreads in ever milder rays throughout 
the whole state.”
23 
 The text culminates in the rhetorical celebration of the theater event as a truly mystic moment 
in which all barriers of the conventional world of artifice (künstliche Welt) fall down and 
humanity looks itself into the eye: 
And then, finally – what a triumph for you, Nature […] - when humans from all regions and 
classes, having thrown off all shackles of artifice and fashion, having been torn away from all 
throes of fate, becoming brothers through one all-weaving sympathy, being absorbed into one 
kind, forget themselves and the world and come near their celestial origin. Each one of them 
enjoys the raptures of all, which fall back on him stronger and more beautiful from a hundred 
eyes, and there is now in his chest room for only one feeling – it is this: to be a human. 
(Und dann endlich – welch ein Triumph für dich, Natur [...] – wenn Menschen aus allen Zonen 
und Ständen, abgeworfen jede Fessel der Künstelei und der Mode, herausgerissen aus jedem 
Drange des Schicksals, durch eine allwebende Sympathie verbrüdert, in ein Geschlecht wieder 
aufgelöst, ihrer selbst und der Welt vergessen und ihrem himmlischen Ursprung sich nähern. 
Jeder einzelne genießt die Entzückungen aller, die verstärkt und verschönert aus hundert 
Augen auf ihn zurückfallen, und seine Brust gibt jetzt nur einer Empfindung Raum – es ist 
diese: ein Mensch zu sein. (p. 831; emphasis mine, HJS) 
 
This apotheosis of the theater audience as the physical epiphany of the idea of humanity 
appears to have been inspired by Rousseau’s famous glorification of the political community 
celebrating itself by fusing together in an all-encompassing look into each other’s eye. Yet 
Rousseau’s Lettre à d’Alembert sur les spectacles (which appeared in 1758, in close 
proximity to Diderot’s dramatic and dramaturgical writings) was a pointed attack against the 
theater institution, indeed the harshest anti-theatrical polemic of the age, reminiscent of 
                                                 
21 “[...] aucun ne pourra se dérober aux traits de cette sympathie si supérieure aux vues retrécies de l’amour-
propre et de l’intérêt personnel” (ibid., p. 1337). 
22 “[...] il s’agit de rendre ce tableau utile, c’est-à-dire de le mettre à la portée du plus grand nombre, afin que 
l’image qu’il présentera serve à lier entre eux les hommes par le sentiment victorieux de la compassion e de la 
pitié” (ibid., p. 1141). 
23 Friedrich Schiller, « Was kann eine gute stehende Schaubühne eigentlich wirken ?», [original title], in : Werke, 
ed. Gerhart Fricke und Herbert G. Göpfert, 9. Aufl., Bd. 5, München 
191993, p.828 (translation mine). Schneider 
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traditional theological invectives. For Rousseau, the theater represented the collective 
degeneration of society into a fraudulent and inauthentic state which it continuously 
reinforced; the spectators’ gaze, directed from the dark auditorium on to the bright stage, 
amounted to their seduction into a chimerical world that instilled into them an infinite and 
insatiable desire and drew them away from their familial and civic bonds and duties. To this 
alienating experience Rousseau opposed the image of the festive crowd gathering under the 
open sky; the fictive stage representation and its passive consumption were to be replaced 
with the self representation of the ‘people’. 
The comparison with Rousseau illuminates the imaginary character of Schiller’s collective 
evoked by the theatrical representation. While Rousseau concerned himself with the festive 
self-staging of a political community, taken in its original sense of the polis, which the 
Geneva-born Paris intellectual saw corrupted by a theater identified with the court tradition, 
Schiller exalts the common feeling of an abstract humanity (“ein Mensch zu sein”) stripped of 
all foreign determinations. For Schiller, the theater audience becomes a symbolic body 
representing humankind, whereas Rousseau focused on the celebratory elevation of a small 
community that does not extend beyond its physical boundaries (“visible at a glance”). And 
yet, Rousseau’s festive crowd likewise suggests an entity transfigured into a transparent, 
quasi-immaterial whole, manifest by the exclusive communication through the eye: this is not 
the pre-modern body Koschorke describes, nor the Bakhtinian body collective. Both 
Rousseau and Schiller extol the moment of a collective fusion, only what for Rousseau is the 
heightened moment within the continuity of civic interaction when the political body becomes 
aware of itself, for Schiller - as for the dominant dramaturgy of the time – is the transcending 
(cf. “abgeworfen”, “herausgerissen”) constitution of a universal body brought about by the 
theater performance. 
This universal bonding in mutual transparency, finally, is achieved through the drama’s and 
the performance’s own psychological transparency; it is through the insight into the interior 
life of its characters that the play brings about the spiritual body of the audience. Here the 
semiotics of the new stage intersect with the form and content of the new dramatic 
production. Again, a glance at Rousseau’s anti-theatrical stance is illuminating. Rousseau had 
directed his critique in particular against matters of political and erotic intrigue for their 
intrinsic evocation of ambition, flattery, hierarchy or their provocation of frivolousness, 
coquettishness, masquerade. These sujets were typical of an institution which for him was 
founded on simulation and dissimulation, in utter opposition to the cherished values of 
sincerity, authenticity, and transparency. But the latter values were also the ones on which the Schneider 
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fourth wall dramaturgy was founded, as its preferred setting in the private and domestic 
sphere and its call for emotional identification demonstrates. When Rousseau wrote his anti-
theater polemic, the new domestic drama had barely made its way to the stage (he may, 
however, have known the two model plays by his fellow encyclopedist Diderot.) 
Nevertheless, even the intimate family values of Diderot’s Fils naturel and Père de famille 
would not have changed Rousseau’s denunciation of the theatrical medium, which is at its 
core a critique of fictional representation as such. It is the assuming of a fictional “role” as 
such, no matter what its nature, both on the side of the actor and the empathetic spectator that 
for Rousseau undermines the authenticity of the family and civic life and leads man astray 
from the narrow confines of responsible interaction. To put it in the most pointed way: The 
on-stage “house father” could only represent the true house father’s perversion. 
I wish to conclude with a brief look at Diderot’s domestic dramas and dramaturgy of the mid-
fifties (theory and practice are here closely interwoven and may not be separated from each 
other). These writings attempt to reconcile the values of transparency and intimacy with the 
theater, and therefore provide the best illustration both of the intent and the aporia of the 
fourth wall. In particular, Le fils naturel ou les épreuves de la vertu together with its dialogue 
frame, Entretiens sur le fils naturel, containing the author’s fictional discussions with his hero 
about the play, (1757) carries the experiment of an “authentic theater” to a paradoxical 
extreme. The author Diderot pretends to have met his protagonist in a provincial town far 
from Paris (and its corrupt theater, one is to conclude), who invites him to be the secret 
observer of a theater performance staged exclusively by and for members of his family in 
commemoration of an important episode in their life exactly one year ago. The father of the 
“natural son” had commissioned the play from him immediately after the event, asking for 
absolute faithfulness to the facts as they happened and the words as they were spoken, as well 
as for the identity of the real and the stage actors. This, then, is not designed to be a “play” but 
the script for a commemorative family rite, to be repeated every year on the original scene, 
the family salon, for an indefinite future. Yet the fictional and theatrical character of the 
representation can not be eliminated. In the Entretiens, Dorval, the son and (fictional) author 
attests to his difficult position between these two roles and their irreconcilable dictates: As 
son he has to stick to the father’s imposition of faithfulness to the facts, as dramatist he needs 
to heed aesthetic standards, specifically the norm of vraisemblance. (Incidentally, this is also 
a conflict between two family concepts, one relying on linear genealogy – adherence to the 
legacy of the father – and one, on egalitarian siblinghood; this perspective finds its expression 
in the protagonist’s status as “natural son” and ties in with the idea of spiritualization.) Schneider 
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The intended non-theatrical character of the “family play” is further violated on the level of 
performance, first by the spectator, represented by the hidden visitor and voyeur “Diderot,“ 
and second by the outside actor who has to substitute for the recently deceased father. The 
hidden Diderot is a perfect allegory of the new role of the spectator as voyeur (the unobserved 
observer). Even more significant is the fact of the father’s death and his replacement by a 
“professional”. In the frame text, Diderot claims to have received the written manuscript from 
his friend Dorval after the performance was abruptly broken off a few moments before the 
end. This happened when the “authentic” family players all broke into tears at the appearance 
on stage of the actor-father, which reminded them of the loss of their real father. Diderot 
confesses that at this instant he was tempted to join the common grief and jump on the stage. 
Being a stranger (the visitor Diderot) is the one marker of distance between reality and 
performance, death is the other. And it is this twofold distance that provides the condition for 
both a wider and more intensely bonded community. The clandestine spectator from Paris 
wishing to become part of a family body melting in tears because of the father’s death 
signifies the new dramaturgy’s ultimate utopian intent. 
Put differently: Separation and loss lie at the origin of the spiritual community.
24 The action 
of the play reproduces this figure on the level of the romantic plot: The natural son renounces 
his passionate desire for the fiancée of his friend (who does the same), a desire which turns 
out to be of an unconsciously incestuous nature, since the two are – unbeknownst to 
themselves – siblings. When the long-absent father, who is also unknown to his children, 
finally comes home and reveals the blood relationship, he only puts his paternal seal on a 
sacrifice that the lovers have already made on their own. Passion and “blood” – incest being 
the metaphor for the entanglement both in sexuality and the origin – are overcome not by the 
external contingencies of genealogy or the law, as embodied in the father, but by reason and 
virtue.  
This victory, however, demands a heavy price: the price of carnal desire, the price of the 
body. A similar price has to be paid by the spectator, whose embodiment in the fictional 
world of the stage presupposes his abstraction from his existential, corporeal and social 
rooted-ness. The discontinuity stressed earlier between the audience and the stage and the 
transition (or should we say: leap) from the one to the other – what I called spiritualization, 
                                                 
24 For this point, cf. Jay Caplan, Framed  arratives: Diderot's Genealogy of the Beholder. Afterword by Jochen 
Schulte-Sasse, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985. The afterword enlarges the concept into the 
concept of a “sacrificial structure of modernity”. The notion of loss and sacrifice is also stressed by Heeg (note 
xxx), pp. 83sq., who applies it specifically to the death of the female (daughter) in bourgeois tragedy. Beyond the 
often invoked father-daughter constellation, I would like to suggest a “sacrificial structure” of the plot as a whole 
in that it subordinates the individual characters (as well as the actors on the level of the performance) under the 
order of an overarching “whole”.  Schneider 
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Vergeistigung – demands the sacrifice of the sensual and particular (for which the female 
body is but one, however prominent, symbolic representation). This sacrifice comes about on 
the level of the stage action taken in its whole; it transcends the spectators’ empathetic 
identification with a particular character, just as the individual actors, by projecting 
themselves into their respective roles, become part of a larger entity. Therefore, the 
“imaginary collective” of the audience finds its equivalent in the structure of the dramatic text, 
which is characterized by the integration of the manifold into a meaningful totality; in other 
words, by the sublimation of the “genealogical” and factual into the fictional. 
Diderot’s concept of the tableau, which challenges the physical, three-dimensional character 
of the stage, can be seen as the formal equivalent of this spirituality. Commonly designating 
the “painting-like” quality of an enclosing visual frame, or “still,” applied to the theatrical 
stage the term emphasizes as it were the non-corporeality of the world the spectator enters 
into.
25 The tableau as the inherent telos of the theatrical performance marks the sacrifice of 
the spectator’s individual body. 
Lessing’s great enlightenment play,  athan der Weise (1779), will make a similar moral 
sacrifice and overcoming of incestuous passion the basis for a spectacular reunion of 
dispersed und unwitting family members of different ethnicities and creeds. When at the end 
“the curtain falls among repeated embraces,” as the stage instruction says, this symbolic 
family of mankind includes all members of the theater audience and beyond. The spiritual 
community which the fourth wall dramaturgy aimed to produce appears to reach its climax at 
the very same moment that the visible scene is withdrawn from the spectators. The 
                                                 
25 In an important essay, “Diderot, Brecht, Eisenstein,” which stresses the intellectual and moral (“ideological”) 
quality of the theatrical tableau, Roland Barthes cites a passage from Diderot’s Encyclopédie article 
“Composition”, which compares the perfect tableau to the organization of the body: “A well-composed picture 
[tableau] is a whole contained under a single point of view, in which the parts work together to one end and form 
by their mutual correspondence a unity as real as that of the members of the body of an animal; so that a piece of 
painting made up of a large number of figures thrown at random on to the canvas, with neither proportion, 
intelligence nor unity, no more deserves to be called a true composition than scattered studies of legs, nose and 
eyes on the same cartoon deserve to be called a portrait or even a human figure.” Barthes analyses critically: 
“Thus is the body expressly introduced into the idea of the tableau, but it is the whole body that is so introduced 
– the organs, grouped together and as though held in cohesion by the magnetic power of the segmentation, 
function in the name of a transcendence, that of the figure, which receives the full fetishistic load and becomes 
the sublime substitute of meaning: it this meaning that is fetishized.” The connection between the ideal body 
organism (specifically, the human body as realized in sculpture) and the “well composed” tableau – for Barthes 
the “fetish” of meaning - opens up yet another perspective pertinent to our topic of empathy and the formation of 
an ideal or imaginary collective. For the body sculpture served as a model object of the faculty of Einfühlung, 
precisely in that it was distinguished by its ideal wholeness, Ganzheit, produced by the abstraction from all 
corporeal ‘particularities’. (Cf. especially Herder’s text Plastik.) - Roland Barthes, “Diderot, Brecht, Eisenstein”, 
in: Image, Music Text. Essays selected and translated by Stephen Heath, New York 1988, pp. 69-78; p. 71sq. 
(emphasis original). German translation in: Id., Der entgegenkommende und der stumpfe Sinn. Kritische Essays 
III. Aus dem Französischen von Dieter Hornig, Frankfurt am Main 1990, S. 96. The Diderot quote in: 
„Composition“:„Un tableau bien composé est un tout renfermé sous un seul point de vue, où les parties 
concourent à un même but, et forment par leur correspondence mutuelle un ensemble aussi réel, que celui des 
members dans un corps animal.” Schneider 
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“transcendence” of this process reveals its religious background: On the title page of his 
drama, Lessing put the epigraph: “Introite, nam et heic dei sunt;” “enter, here too are the 
gods”. A similar religious dimension opens up in Diderot’s eulogy of Samuel Richardson, 
whose epistolary family novels were a supreme source of inspiration for the new drama and 
dramaturgy. For Diderot, these texts compare with “an even holier book, an evangile brought 
to earth in order to separate the husband from the spouse, the father from the son, the daughter 
from the mother, the brother from the sister”. Just as Christ postulated the separation of 
worldly family ties in the name of a higher, spiritual family, Richardson and his followers 
postulate the production of spiritual family of mankind. Sacrifice and the eucharist emerge to 
be the ultimate goal of the dramaturgy of the fourth wall. 